NEWS
SCIA Open Day Held at Qianhai International Arbitration Tower
On July 23, 2025, the Mid-Summer Appointment | SCIA Open Day: Young Lawyers’ Session was held at the Qianhai International Arbitration Tower (SCIA TOWER). The event was hosted by the Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (South China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, Greater Bay Area International Arbitration Center, abbreviated in English as SCIA), and attended by over 200 young lawyers from 130 law firms.
Zhong Yiqi, Associate Legal Counsel of SCIA’s Department of International Cooperation and Development, introduced the innovative development of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone’s international arbitration institution and shared various avenues for young lawyers to engage in arbitration practice. The event concluded with a guided tour of SCIA’s Qianhai headquarters, including its office facilities and hearing rooms.
CIETAC Visits the UK to Promote Legal Exchange During Dispute Resolution Week
To encourage parties, arbitral tribunals, and other participants in arbitration to proactively and prudently adopt artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, and to accelerate the integration of AI into arbitral proceedings, while balancing efficiency with risk management, safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the parties, and enhancing the credibility of arbitration, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) has issued the Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence Technology in Arbitration (Trial Implementation) (hereinafter “AI Guidelines”).
Formulated in accordance with the spirit of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules, based on CIETAC's arbitration practice, and with reference to internationally accepted standards, the AI Guidelines came into effect on July 18, 2025, and will be subject to periodic evaluation and ad hoc revisions.
The AI Guidelines set out three fundamental principles for the use of AI in arbitration: party autonomy, auxiliary function (non-decision-making), and good faith. While affirming that parties have the right to agree on whether and how AI may be used in arbitration, the Guidelines emphasize that AI technologies shall not replace the independent adjudicative role of the arbitral tribunal, nor relieve parties of their duty to submit truthful pleadings and evidence. Furthermore, the Guidelines clarify that AI must not restrict the parties’ right to reasonably present their case, nor diminish the tribunal’s responsibility to diligently and efficiently conduct the arbitration proceedings.
The Newly Revised UK Arbitration Act (2025) to Officially Take Effect on August 1
According to an executive order signed by Sarah Sackman, Minister of Justice of the United Kingdom, the newly revised UK Arbitration Act (2025) will officially come into effect on August 1, 2025.
The current UK Arbitration Act dates back to 1996. The key revisions introduced in the UK Arbitration Act (2025) focus on six main areas:
1. Determination of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement;
2. Introduction of a summary dismissal mechanism;
3. Arbitrators’ duty of disclosure;
4. Emergency arbitrators’ authority to issue interim measures;
5. Immunity of arbitrators from liability;
6. Simplification of judicial review procedures in arbitration.
Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court:
Refusal to Acknowledge a Properly Served Notice of Assignment of Claims Constitutes Concealment of Evidence
Legal Basis:
"Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China"
Article 58
A party may apply to the intermediate people’s court at the seat of the arbitration commission to set aside an arbitral award if evidence shows any of the following:
1. Absence of an arbitration agreement;
2. Matters decided exceed the scope of the arbitration agreement or fall outside the commission’s jurisdiction;
3. Improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal or procedural violations;
4. The award is based on forged evidence;
5. The opposing party concealed evidence that could affect the impartiality of the award;
6. Arbitrators have engaged in bribery, acted with favoritism or rendered the award in violation of the law.
If verified upon review, the court shall rule to set aside the award. The court shall also set aside an award ex officio if it violates public interest.
Case Description:
In 2019, Company A (the employer) and Jiangsu Construction Group Co., Ltd. (the contractor) signed a professional subcontract agreement for the drainage works of the Harbor Interchange section under the Furong Avenue Upgrade Project in Jiangyin City. The total contract price (inclusive of tax) was RMB 5,605,786.15, based on a fixed unit price. The annex to the contract specified payment conditions (e.g., payment upon satisfaction of four conditions) and prohibited the assignment of contract rights and obligations without Company A’s consent, with a penalty clause of 10% of the contract value for unauthorized assignment. The subcontractor also waived the right to claim interest or penalties for late payments.
In 2020, the parties confirmed the final settlement amount as RMB 4,865,464.20. Invoices totaling this amount were issued on June 18, 2020, and January 22, 2021. Project completion and acceptance occurred on June 14, 2022. As of the arbitration filing date, Company A had paid RMB 3,350,000.
On February 1, 2023, Jiangsu Construction assigned its remaining receivables (excluding the retention amount, totaling RMB 1,272,190.99) and the retention receivables (RMB 243,273.21) to Shanghai Company via a Receivables Assignment Agreement.
On September 18, 2023, Shanghai Company’s legal representative Zhu Wentao sent a Notice of Assignment of Receivables via EMS in Jiangsu’s name to Company A’s registered address, but the delivery was returned. On the same day, another notice was sent in an individual capacity by Kang Yu to an address in Nanjing, received by Yang Shu. During arbitration, Shanghai Company also emailed the notice to project manager Xu Mouyan. The EMS record showed that the delivery to Company A (attn: Chen Mouguo, Wuhan *** Road) was signed for by a “colleague” on September 21 and later refused and returned by the recipient on October 20. The status of the delivery to the Nanjing address was recorded separately. The recipient was Yang Shu, while Xu Mouyan had already left the company.
The Wuhan Arbitration Commission found that the disputed project was a model “Safe Construction Site” for highway and water transport in Jiangsu Province and classified as a road drainage project. The tribunal held the subcontract to be valid. However, due to insufficient proof from Shanghai Company that Company A had been lawfully notified of the assignment, the tribunal relied on Article 546 of the Civil Code (“An assignment of a claim does not take effect against the debtor unless the debtor is notified”) and ruled the assignment ineffective against Company A. Shanghai Company’s arbitration claims were dismissed, and it was ordered to bear the arbitration fee of RMB 34,135. The award (No. (2024) Wu Zhong Cai Zi No. 000001356) was issued on March 17, 2024.
Court's View:
The court held that the key legal issue was whether the notice of assignment had been properly served and whether there were any procedural irregularities justifying annulment. According to Article 58 of the Arbitration Law, a party may request annulment on grounds of procedural violations or concealment of material evidence affecting the fairness of the award. Judicial interpretations also clarify that “procedural violations” refer to breaches of statutory procedures or agreed arbitration rules that may impact the correctness of the award. Article 9 of the Arbitration Law enshrines the “one final award” principle, barring re-litigation or re-arbitration of the same dispute after the award becomes effective.
Under Article 546 of the Civil Code, an assignment is not binding on the debtor without notice. However, the law does not prohibit the assignee from issuing the notice, nor does it restrict the form of such notice. The decisive factor is whether the debtor becomes aware of the assignment. The Supreme People’s Court has also affirmed in precedent that once the debtor is proven to have knowledge of the assignment, the notification is legally effective.
In this case, Shanghai Company submitted EMS delivery receipts, signature records, and emails as evidence of notice. Even if the arbitral tribunal acknowledged the returned delivery, Company A’s denial of receipt despite this record clearly violates the Civil Code’s Article 7 principle of good faith (“Civil subjects shall follow the principle of good faith, acting honestly and keeping promises”). Throughout the arbitration, Company A, despite being aware of the assignment, failed to provide any counter-evidence regarding the signed and returned delivery. Its denial constitutes concealment of material evidence, falling within the scope of Article 58 of the Arbitration Law.
Considering the relevant laws and facts, the arbitral tribunal’s conclusion that the assignment was ineffective due to failed notice overlooked the duty of good faith and the totality of the evidence. Upholding the award would leave Shanghai Company without recourse under the finality principle, undermining judicial fairness. Therefore, the court held that the arbitral award involved procedural violations and concealment of evidence and ruled, pursuant to Article 58 of the Arbitration Law, to set aside arbitral award No. (2024) Wu Zhong Cai Zi No. 000001356.
Singapore High Court:
Implied Rejection of Defences in Arbitration Does Not Breach Natural Justice; Setting-Aside Application Dismissed
Case Description:
In December 2016, Company T and Company P entered into an engineering subcontract package for the Fadhili Gas Processing Plant project in Saudi Arabia. The contract comprised multiple documents, in descending order of priority:
1. Purchase Order (PO)
2. Deviation List to the General Terms and Conditions of Subcontract (GTCCS)
3. Purchase Order Requisition
4. General Terms and Conditions of Subcontract (GTCCS)
5. Conflicting Arbitration Clauses:
PO (highest priority), clause 11.1: “Arbitration shall be emergency arbitration, seated in London, governed by the law of England and Wales, without designating any institution.”
GTCCS (lowest priority), clause 32: “ICC Rules shall apply, with a three-member tribunal, seated in Riyadh, under Saudi law.”
Deviation List: Mentions “ICC arbitration + London,” but this language was never incorporated into the final Purchase Order.
In 2022, Company P sued in the Saudi courts but was dismissed for lack of a valid arbitration agreement, then failed to initiate LCIA arbitration.
In October 2023, Company P commenced ICC arbitration. Company T filed jurisdictional objections and appointed arbitrators.
On 22 March 2024, in its draft Terms of Reference, Company T reiterated that the agreement provided only for emergency arbitration and that the ICC had no jurisdiction. The tribunal accepted this objection, deferred its decision, and agreed to hear jurisdiction first.
On 18 October 2024, the ICC tribunal issued a partial award, finding it had jurisdiction on the basis that the contract documents could be read together and the parties must have selected ICC arbitration seated in London.
On 15 December 2024, Company T applied under section 67 of the UK Arbitration Act 1996 to set aside that partial award.
On 5 March 2025, Company P belatedly filed its Acknowledgment of Service nearly two months late and made conflicting procedural applications.
Court’s View:
The Court first addressed Company P’s application for relief from sanction regarding its delayed filing of the Acknowledgment of Service (AoS). Applying the three-stage test established in Denton, the Court found that the delay constituted a serious breach rather than a mere technical glitch. Company P’s failure to file the AoS within the statutory deadline forced the Court to list a hearing date in its absence, substantially disrupting procedural order. Company P’s explanations—that it needed to investigate the validity of service and accommodate counsel’s holiday—were rejected as unreasonable; any experienced practitioner would appreciate the importance of timely filing an AoS before challenging the Court’s jurisdiction. Balancing due process, fairness, and judicial efficiency, the Court held that Company P should not be granted procedural relief, in order to preserve the integrity and efficacy of the arbitration-judicial review process.
Although Company P lost formal party status due to its procedural default, the Court, in the interests of a fair trial, exercised its discretion to allow counsel to appear “de bene esse” and make submissions on the merits. The Court then conducted a full de novo hearing of Company T’s jurisdiction challenge under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996, independent of the ICC tribunal’s prior ruling.
Company P’s argument that Company T had waived its jurisdictional objection by not raising it promptly was comprehensively rejected. The Court noted that, during the arbitration, Company P never contested the timeliness of the objection but instead engaged fully with its substantive merits. Under the principle from Diag Human, a party that does not challenge the timeliness of an opponent’s jurisdictional objection at arbitration forfeits the right to do so before the Court.
The Court further held that Company T’s objection was made within the timeframe permitted by the arbitral tribunal. By including the objection in the draft Terms of Reference and prioritizing its resolution—together with other preliminary issues—the tribunal had effectively “admitted” the jurisdictional challenge pursuant to section 31(3) of the Act. Accordingly, Company T’s stance before the Court was procedurally proper.
On the merits, the Court independently construed the contract documents. It observed that the Purchase Order, explicitly designated as the highest-priority document, must prevail over all others. Clause 11.1 of the Purchase Order clearly provided for non-institutional emergency arbitration in London under the law of England and Wales, with no mention of the ICC. By contrast, clause 32 of the General Terms and Conditions mandated ICC arbitration in Riyadh under Saudi law. These provisions were fundamentally irreconcilable on form, seat, and governing law.
The Court firmly rejected the “pick-and-mix” approach advanced by Company P and the arbitral tribunal—an attempt to combine the London seat from the Purchase Order with ICC Rules from the GTCCS into a hybrid arbitration clause. Legally, once two clauses conflict, the lower-priority provision must be entirely displaced in favor of the higher-priority one.
The Court emphasized that the differences between emergency arbitration and ICC institutional arbitration are substantive, not mere procedural details. They encompass appeal rights, arbitrator appointment mechanisms, case-management regimes, and fee structures—core aspects of the dispute-resolution mechanism agreed by the parties.
For these reasons, the Court concluded that the only valid arbitration agreement was the London emergency arbitration under clause 11.1 of the Purchase Order, and that the ICC tribunal was never vested with jurisdiction. Pursuant to section 67(3)(c) of the Arbitration Act 1996, the Court set aside the portion of the ICC tribunal’s partial award purporting to assert jurisdiction.